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POWER (lessness) AND DISPERSION
COMMENTS ON CHESTER McGUIRE'S
THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
1974, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
FUNDS AND BLACK ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS
Henry W. McGee, Jr.*
Chester McGuire's comprehensive, provocative and good-humored as-
sessment of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
(HCDA)1 suggests both ominous and benign trends in the shift of political
power and allocation of material resources in the United States. His tracing
of the transfer of the locus of decision-making from city halls to county
boards and state houses portends the further erosion of the power of the
federal/urban political machines coalition which through the sixties gave
such force and influence to Black social, political and economic needs. On
the other hand, the Act's policy of dispersion of minority groups,2 accelerated
by the "new" public housing and allied strategies for spreading over a wide
geographical area previously urban-concentrated subsidized housing, may in
the long run lead to greater affluence for minorities integrated but submerged
in white-dominated suburban areas.'
First, consider the ominous aspects of McGuire's analysis. As he
suggests, the HCDA flows in part out of the discontent and reaction to urban
development policies of the sixties. Perhaps Daniel P. Moynihan anticipated
the bitterness of the discontent. He termed "community action programs of
the war on poverty" as a "debacle" and proclaimed derisively about "the
soaring rhetoric, the minimum performance; the feigned constancy, the pri-
vate betrayal; in the end . . . the sell-out."'4 True, last minute compromis-
* Professor of Law, UCLA. Member of California and Illinois Bars. J.D., 1957,
DePaul; LLM., 1970, Columbia.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 et seq. (1974).
2. See Title I § 101(c) (6), 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1970). Doubts about the dispersal policy's
efficacy were expressed while the ink on President Ford's signature was barely dry. See, for
instance, Kristof, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: Prospects and
Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. & Bus. 120 (1975).
3. Dispersion at the very least should enhance employment opportunities since as long
ago as 1968 it was clear that "[miost new employment opportunities are being created in the
suburban portions of our metropolitan areas, not anywhere near central-city ghettos." DowNs,
ALTERNATIrvE FUTURES FOR THE AMERICAN GHETTO 97 (1968). See also REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CivIL DISORDERS 127 (1968).
4. D. MOYNDIAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MIsuNDEnsrANDINo 203 (1969).
es led to an Act which has retained older subsidy strategies (such as Sections
235 and 236 subsidized home-ownership and private rental programs) and
led to the delay of such conservative conceptions as the housing allowance
program which was kept at experiment scale.5 But on the whole McGuire is
essentially correct: the new Act is in part a post-Nixon era triumph of the
forces -that led to Nixon's rise to power. These forces must be frankly
recognized for what they are: regressive and anti-minority though often
masked as fiscally conservative.
Moreover, what is especially troublesome is the fact that for the first
time since the Second World War, Black interests may be on the "losing" side
of a national movement validated by both historical and contemporary cir-
cumstance, a sharp contrast to the civil rights movement which was part of a
world-wide post-war struggle against colonialism and racism.6 Indeed, it
was a protest in which "the Black Panther party was the swaggering super-
stars of the radical movement."'
But regionalism, and its concomitant environmentalism, appears as an
inexorable response to the forces of growth which menace the rational
development of natural and social resources. Thus demands that decisions
be made at a regional level in order to enhance coordination and to check the
cancer of rampant expansion tend to accelerate the shift of political power
from. cities to county, or even state-wide structures of decision. Put another
way, it is clear that mega-cities (SMSA's in current parlance) and their
surrounding dormitories require a comprehensiveness of planning that simply
cannot be effectuated alone from the central cities. It is now beyond serious
dispute-as the planning literature and legislation of the past ten years
affirms-that the viability of critical social and economic decisions depends
"upon the accommodation of widely disparate interests for their ultimate
resolution. To that end, state-wide or regional control of planning . . .
insure[s] that interests broader than that of a municipality underlie various
land use policies."8  So it is that the natural demands of the economic and
social order propel decision-making upwards to a level where Blacks rarely
participate.
Though McGuire seems to believe the shift to regionalism in decision-
making stems from disenchantment with -the "parochialism" of local govern-
ments, more likely, at least in what he calls "liberal circles," it is the rise of
demands for a regional perspective that has legitimated a movement which
offers effective and efficient decision-making but is potentially resistant to the
gains and aspirations of minority groups. Most Blacks, despite dramati-
cally increasing migration to suburban areas, are still inner-city residents.'
5. See McGee, Book Review, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 734 (1975); and Nenno, The Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974: An Interpretation, Its History, 8 J. HOUSING 344
(1974).
6. See H. CRUSE, THE CRIsIs OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL 553 (1967); cf. I. WAL-
LERSTEIN, AFRICA THE POLmCS OF INDEPENDENCE 85 et seq. (1961).
7. L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1975, Pt. 1, at 3, col. 6.
8. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Rampo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 300 (1972). See
also Hagman, URnAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw 527-89 (1975).
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973, at 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BLACK POPULATION
REPOT].
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To the extent that decision-making is transferred from the cities to the
counties or the states, to that extent are Blacks deprived of real power to
shape change. It should also be clear -that the conflict is not between Federal
and local decision-making, as McGuire's paper runs the danger of suggesting,
but between urban power and suburban state/wide power. That is what the
Nixon revolution was all about and that in part is what the shift to regional-
ism is all about. The poverty programs represented an axis between a
progressive Federal bureaucracy, a sympathetic Congress and President, and
liberal forces in the urban areas. 10 In many cases, of course, as McGuire
correctly suggests, these forces were anti-machine and anti-urban political
establishments. But the real point is that national resources were directed
towards the shame of ,the cities, the recently exploding ghettos which threat-
ened (if ever so briefly) to shake the Republic to its foundations. Indeed,
the poverty programs were local and urban control with a vengeance. Not
only were the funds directed at inner-city problems, but the inner-city resi-
dents were given the promise of real influence on how those funds were spent.
"And a concerned and active Federal judiciary exercised judicial review so
as to insure that not only the letter but the spirit of the new policies was
implemented.""
As McGuire suggests, then, the shift towards regionalism in decision-
making and the Block grant strategy in particular, both confirms the hege-
mony of traditional (read white) forces within the city, and reinforces this
domination by a similar strategy for allocating resources on a state-wide level.
And if the funds have come to the states to use as they please, can the loss of
federal control be far behind? Though the HCDA of 1974 was passed with
a meaningful federal presence through Federal standards and guidelines, the
momentum of Nixon's "New Federalism" may be irreversible. Of course, the
power of Federal oversight must not be overemphasized. The Black caucus
may be Black, but it is certainly not very large, and with one Senator and
relatively low representation at the policy-making levels of the bureaucracy, it
is arguable that "Black power" at any level is more mirage than reality.
Nonetheless, there are more Black Congressmen and Black city councilmen
and Black mayors than Black state legislators or county supervisors.' 2
Thus, no matter the perspective, the new Act paves the way for a
defeasance of Black political power, just as it seemed within their grasp. And
here McGuire is at his most sociological incisive. For the poverty program
was an escape hatch for Black middle class until the sixties trapped an
economic and social cul de sac. Literally thousands of Black managers and
even entrepreneurs were forged in the poverty programs and the social
programs of the middle and late sixties. Finally, after decades of visible but
often symbolic leadership, Blacks began to develop a leadership infra-strue-
ture, so vital to the orchestration of the total development of the Black
community's economic development. The current reaction to Black
10. See D. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING 75-101 (1969).
11. Shanon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) and Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1975).
12. See BLACK POPULATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 124 el seq. which indicated 1,360
Black elected officials at the city level as opposed to 17 Blacks in Congress, 239 county and
242 state officials.
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progress, of which the shift in political power that regionalism reflects is an
emanation, is indeed an ominous overtone of McGuire's analysis, one which,
in sum, he avoids and obsfucates in an effort to emphasize the more positive
aspects of the new Act.
But as suggested at the beginning of these comments, there is a poten-
tially benign aspect to the Act. As Kenneth Clark has said, the "issue of the
rights of the American Negroes will probably not be resolved either by verbal
or strategic preoccupation with love or with hatred. The issue may be more
realistically resolved by less tenuous emotions, -such as enlightened self-interest
on the part of Negroes and whites, a shared destiny, and the imperatives of
the contemporary threat to the national survival."'13 It can be argued that the
Act's dispersal policies embodied in Section 8, and buttressed by HUD
"resettlement" policies designed to break up Black inner-city concentrations,
speaks to a shared destiny between whites and Blacks and may facilitate
increased Black participation in the material resources of the society (though
ironically, as McGuire points out about the Post Office, at a time when those
resources seem to be shrinking dramatically).
To be sure, Federal dispersal policy did not commence with the 1974
HCDA. As early as the mid-1950's dispersal emerged as an answer to
housing segregation. In its 1959 Annual Report, the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights showed its approval of a dispersal policy by recommend-
ing that
"... The Public Housing Administration take affirmative action to en-
courage the selection of sites on open land in good areas outside the
present centers of racial concentration. PHA should put the local hous-
ing authorities on notice that their proposals will be evaluated in this
light."14
But a more visible affirmation of dispersal was embodied in President Kenne-
dy's 1962 Executive Order 11063 which directed all departments and agen-
cies to take the actions necessary to prevent segregation in housing. 15 The
landmark Civil Rights Acts of 196416 and 196817 also expressed a dispersal
philosophy and in 1967, HUD's Low Rent Housing Manual specifically
stressed a site selection policy which provided that housing located in areas of
racial concentration would be "prima facie unacceptable."'" In February of
1972, HUD published site selection criteria for Section 23519 and 23620
programs which called for a "poor rating" for any proposed project which is
likely to cause a substantially racially mixed area to become one of minority
concentration.2 1
The scatter-site, dispersed public housing program envisioned by Section
8 may, therefore, impact in a benign fashion on the nation's racial minorities.
13. See K. CLARK, BLACK GHETTO 219 (1965).
14. See UNrr STATES COMMISSION ON CIVl. RIGHTS, ANNuAL REPORT 1970 which refers
to the recommendation in the 1959 Report.
15. Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 F.R. 11527.
16. Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
17. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
18. Low-Rent Housing Manual § 205.1 2 (1968).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 17152 (1970).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 17152z-1 (1970).
21. 24 C.F.R. § 200.700 (1973).
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To be sure, dispersal strategy is as much art as policy, forcing its practitioners
to insure that racial minorities will not be wholly absorbed but also to assure
that the influx does not "tip" the community into a new ghetto. But the
advantages of dispersal are substantial. Easier physical access to job oppor-
tunities could lead to increased employment opportunities. Just as whites
increasingly find it convenient, indeed necessary, to return to the inner city to
live near the executive suite, so it is that many Blacks have been excluded
from job opportunities from which they are separated largely by a combina-
tion of inadequate public transportation and the flight of industry to remote
suburbs. Aside from job opportunities, dispersal might enable many to
escape the unacceptably poor physical and psychological conditions which
still attend living in the inner city. Moreover, educational opportunities
might improve and the busing issue defused if Blacks can walk to and are not
"forced" to bus their way to undeniably superior suburban schools. At the
very least, we would at long last know whether the objection is to "us" or to
the "bus".
Finally, dispersal policy might spread the costs of combating poverty.
The current concentration of the burden of metropolitan living on those least
able to afford it-the economically depressed residents of the city. By fleeing
to affluent neighborhoods outside the cities, whites have successfully isolated
themselves from problems largely created by their flight.22  Dispersal could
force them finally to confront those they fled in their own backyards. Disper-
sal raises the question: why flee the city at all if the Blacks you ran from are
waiting for you when you return in the evening to the suburbs. Dispersal
then may be the last best chance to avoid "two societies, one black, one
white-separate and unequal. ' 23
It must be made clear, however, that Section 8 is no Alladin's lamp of
dispersal. Though the proponents of Section 8's leased housing program
urged, as the proponents of the predecessor Section 23 had argued before
22. It now seems clear that much of New York City's financial crisis stems from its
reception of oppressed/dispossessed Blacks and Puerto Ricans and the subsequent out-migration
of middle-income whites. See for instance, H. Meyer, How Government Helped Ruin the
South Bronx, Fortune, November, 1975, at 140, which traces the phenomenon of urban decay
in one of New York City's most afflicted boroughs. Of course the New York financial
difficulty was predictable on the basis of government studies in the 1960's. For instance the
Douglas Commission indicated in 1968:
The lowest income groups are attracted to the inner city slums because that
is often where the oldest urban housing is offered at the lowest rents. It needs
to be stressed that the weekly rents are often low only because so many people
are crowded into such small and poorly equipped space; figured on a per house
or per room basis, or as a percentage of investment, the rents received by the owner
may be quite high indeed.
The concentration of low-income families places an inordinate burden on each
central city to provide welfare services, expanded police protection, and other costly
public services. Yet the departure of many middle- and upper-income residents and
many industries to the suburbs weakens the central city tax base. The conversion
of neighborhoods from middle-income and low-income occupancy, which occurs when
slums expand, also reduces the prosperity of retail businesses, thereby further depress-
ing the local tax base. So center cities experience a sharp rise in demand for revenue
at the same time that their ability to produce revenue is either static or declining.
The result can be, and sometimes is, death for a neighborhood or the slow strangula-
tion of the city itself. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS
TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
91-34 (1968).
23. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisORY COMMISSION ON CrVm DISORDERS 1 (1968).
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them, that leased housing was the solution to the de facto and de jure
segregation that characterized traditional housing projects, the ultimate out-
'come of the program is in doubt. Though Section 8 promises to mix poor
and middle class tenants into one apartment building or house a lower socio-
economic household in the middle of a middle class neighborhood, the
promise of "economic mix" may well be undercut by both racist and econom-
ic forces. As McGuire points out, "the Achilles Heel of the program is the
fact that HUD is setting 'fair market rents' too low to accommodate new
construction. Due to rampant and sustained inflation in the construction
sector the cost of new construction has risen to the point that it is almost
impossible to build new units at today's construction cost and interest costs
which will rent for less than $300 per month."24  "The middle class in this
country is very conscious of status and worried about its financial investment
in homes, schools and neighborhoods. '25 They may well protect this status
by stiffened resistance to residential integration except at the highest (and for
Blacks, statistically insignificant)26 end of the economic spectrum.
In closing, it must be pointed out that dispersal, described here as a
benign aspect of the 1974 HCDA, is not without its objectionable features.
On a more technical level, it can be argued that an efficient use of dwindling
economic resources ordains a concentration of housing resources at low-cost
sites near those who need the housing. Concern for integration and dispersal
has the danger of obscuring the overriding need for decent shelter. Also,
dispersal writ large has proven to be a dead-end in terms of energy policy.
Dispersal without public transportation may benefit no one. But more
importantly, spreading Blacks out is to spread them thin. The distinctive
aspects of Black culture are surely to suffer dilution if dispersal strategies
siphon off meaningful numbers of Blacks from -their concentration in the city
core.
McGuire, however, is essentially correct in his thesis that the HCDA of
1974 has "much to commend it. . ." and Andrew Brimmer may well have
stated the emerging lesson of the seventies and of HCDA when he said:
"The economic future of blacks in the United States is bound up with
that of the rest of the nation. Programs designed in the future to cope
with the problems of the poor and the disadvantaged will also yield bene-
fits to blacks. In contrast, any efforts to treat blacks separately from
the rest of the nation are likely to lead to frustrations, heightened racial
animosities and a waste of the country's resources." '27
24. C. McGuire, The Urban Development Act of 1974.
25. Friedman & Krier, A New Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 PENN.
L. REV. 611, 625 (1968).
26. See BLACK POPULATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 23 where the following is noted:
Within recent years, it has been noted that significant advances have been made
in closing the Black-white income gap by young Black husband-wife families in the
North and West. Those Black husband-wife families (head under 35) in which
both the husband and wife were earners have actually achieved income parity with
their white counterparts. Although these gains have been impressive, these Black
families in the North and West continue to comprise a very small proportion-
6.2 percent of the 5.3 million Black families in this country in March 1973.
27. Brimmer, Economic Developments in the Black Community, 34 PUBLIC INTEREST 146,
163 (1974).
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